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The complementary currency systems: a tricky issue for economists 
 
 
Abstract: 
By complementary currency systems (CCS) we mean a specific unit of account that complements the official 
currency and has been developed on a group of agents that have formed a network or operate in a defined 
territory, with a view to accounting for and regulating exchanges of goods and services. Despite the topicality 
and the number of CCS, economists seem apparently pays only marginal attention to them. This article suggests 
that economics is based on a particular methodological and epistemological approach and on theoretical and 
normative conceptions of money that prevent it from taking into account the CCS’s practices, their logics and 
their impacts. Their diversity and their relative new emergence confront economics to a methodological problem 
of impact studies. Because of their limited validity, the CCS tend to be considered as peripheral and transitional. 
Last, we show the obstacles that prevent monetary theories to recognize and legitimate them.  
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By complementary currency systems (CCS) we mean a specific unit (or system) of account 
that complements the official currency and has been developed on the initiative of a group of 
agents (individuals, enterprises, NGOs, associations, foundations) that have formed a network 
or operate in a defined territory, with a view to accounting for and regulating exchanges of 
goods and services. 
Complementary Currency Systems (CCS) are by no means new to history; since the 
1980s they have been attracting more and more attention and growing apace in developed as 
in developing economies. In the current state of the question, we have only estimates – in 
most cases debatable – of their extension; their diversity has been overlooked. According to 
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our sources, some 3,500 to 4,500 systems have so far been recorded in more than 50 countries 
(Blanc, 2006; Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013a)1. Among the better-known are the LETS in 
Canada and the United Kingdom (Lee, 1996; North, 2006; Williams, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 
1996d), the time banks in Italy and the UK (Coluccia, 2001; Seyfang, 2006b), the barter clubs 
in Argentina (Gomez, 2009, Ould Ahmed, 2010), the Ithaca Hour in the United States 
(Collom, 2005; Douthwaite, 1996; Jacob et al., 2004), the Regiogeld and the Chiemgauer in 
Germany (Gelleri, 2009; Thiel, 2012), the community development banks in Brazil (Borges, 
2010;  Melo et al., 2009; Neiva et al., 2013), the SOL in France (Fare, 2010, 2011), the 
Brixton pound, The Stroud Pound and the Bristol pound in the UK (Ryan-Collins, 2011; Scott 
Cato and Suárez, 2012), the WIR-type systems in Switzerland (Stodder, 2009), and the 
Accorderies in Quebec and in France (Comeau and Boulianne, 2012; Fare, 2011). The CCS 
are very diverse in their nature and their objectives, their concepts, their forms and modes of 
monetary governance, and the degree of their articulation to political and economic 
institutions (table 1). Nevertheless they share common objectives: those of supporting 
territorial socio-economic and political dynamics, of setting up new economic practices based 
on new standards (ethical, environmental, solidarity) and of promoting empowerment. They 
also challenge, from a theoretical point of view, the role and place of money in the economy.  
Despite the topicality and the number of CCS, economists seem apparently pays only 
marginal attention to them, when it pays any attention at all, if we are to judge by the tiny 
volume of publications on the subject. This lack of interest is all the more puzzling as these 
new monetary systems deal with major economic topics and problems: markets, money, the 
price-setting mechanisms, values, economic governance, to mention only the most obvious.  
Why do these CCS not appeal more to economists? We will attempt in this article to 
answer this question. We will suggest that conventional economics is based on a particular 
methodological and epistemological approach and on theoretical and normative conceptions 
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of money – its essence, size, status, and monetary regulation – that prevent it from taking into 
account the CCS’s practices, their logics and their impacts. In a first section, we will see that 
their diversity and their relative new emergence confront economics to an upstream 
methodological problem of measure and of impact studies. The second section shows that, 
because of their limited validity in time and in space, the CCS tend to be considered as 
peripheral and transitional. The last section shows the obstacles that prevent monetary 
theories to recognize and legitimate them.  
 
A problem of measure and of evaluation of their impact  
CCS seem, because of their very diversity and the fact that they have emerged only relatively 
recently, to pose a methodological problem to economics. They have not yet been thoroughly 
studied; there is no database to document their development, characteristics, specific logics 
and quantitative and qualitative features. Econometric studies not being practicable, it is 
difficult to account properly for individual behaviour, quantitative aspects and the logics in 
operation. This is why fieldwork to be undertaken, to obtain data through analyses of impacts. 
Theoretical work on CCS is still a minority concern, however, as Ryan-Collins (2011) has 
pointed out. This can be explained, in our opinion, by a need to distance oneself in time: so 
many monetary innovations, so different from one another. A lot of empirical research will be 
needed before a theory can be formulated convincingly. 
Furthermore, the lack of directly usable data, there is an important diversity of contexts 
that give rise to CCS and of socio-economic profiles of the actors involved, and of the logics. 
They are differing in their political and ideological bases, theoretical reasoning, modes of 
governance, the material form of their currency, and their connexion with the official currency 
system. CCS are created in geographical contexts: in the countries of the South they often 
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emerge in reaction to an economic crisis, and concern population strata suffering from high 
degrees of social insecurity. These strata are usually impoverished and their support for CCS 
springs mainly from economic needs. In contrast, CCS that emerge in Northern countries are 
linked to more varied social strata, and the motivations concerned are more diverse (not only 
economic, but also environmental or ideological). They have a plurality of aims – single or 
multiple: economic, social, environmental, political (empowerment). Furthermore, for within 
a certain level, the economic one for example, their objective can be very different. While 
some systems, such as Ithaca money in the US (Douthwaite, 1996) are oriented towards the 
local productive apparatus, and employment, production and local dynamics, others target 
growth in sustainable consumption, such as the “green points” customer fidelity cards in the 
NU-Spaarpass in Rotterdam (Sambeek and Kampers, 2004), in the SEL (Laacher, 2003; 
Servet, 1999), on time banks and LETS (Seyfang, 2003, 2006a), and on SOL in France and 
Accorderie in Quebec (Fare, 2011). 
This heterogeneity constitutes a genuine methodological problem to evaluate the 
meaning and the impact of CCS. In development economics, researchers first make field 
surveys known as randomised control trials before moving on to impact studies [cf. The 
approach of Duflo and her J-PAL team (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab), a research 
network specializing in randomized evaluations of social programs] (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2011). Evaluation by randomized control is thus aimed at “establishing a credible comparison 
group, a group of individuals who, as there is no programme, would have given rise to results 
similar to those displayed in the programme” (Duflo, 2005: 188). Using this “control group” 
one can compare the effects on individuals of a programme, project or policy that is being 
envisaged. Surveys of this type usually aim at measuring the effects of a given programme in 
terms of monetary poverty at the individual level, without taking into account the relevant 
structural and institutional conditions. This method, despite its current vogue, is limited in its 
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effects. It predetermines the objectives to be reached, then compares the results obtained with 
these objectives, but without discerning other effects that might have affected the people 
involved in the process being examined. This factor underlies (and undermines) efforts to 
establish direct causal links between the effects and the programme, and to neutralise the 
context in which it is being effectuated. Causality cannot be treated probabilistically when the 
context makes generalisation problematic. This method takes into account only the average 
impact, without capturing the diversity of effects, and does so in the short term (Labrousse, 
2010), hiding ripple effects and those of learning, composition and imitation (Bédécarrats et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, no explanation is given of the reasons, processes and causal 
mechanisms involved, the whys and the wherefores. It establishes only causal links between 
the programme and the effects. Yet the factors involved are multiple, as are the interactions. 
Effects resulting from interactions between multiple factors are always situated socially and 
bear the stamp of the context in which they take place. As a result, causal links should be 
examined in all their complexity, with dynamic interactions being grasped in context, and 
institutional and socio-economic dimensions taken into account. The effects of a programme 
cannot be defined uniquely in terms of predetermined objectives, nor can they be summarised 
by accumulating quantitative data unaccompanied by explanations. 
These stumbling blocks in the way of true understanding make it necessary to adopt an 
alternative method to conduct field surveys using for instance socio-economic and economic-
anthropological methods (quantitative and qualitative by means of individual and/or collective 
interviews and surveys conducted by means of questionnaires). A methodological approach of 
this sort seems to be helpful to reveal the multidimensional nature, the logics and the impacts 
of the monetary facts and practices being examined. It mobilises a comprehensive set of tools, 
starting with observation of monetary practices, and progressively formulating theoretical 
concepts and elaborating them on the basis of experience. This orients research towards 
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production of highly contextualised primary data generated directly by the actual practice of 
fieldwork. The current field surveys on CCS that emanates from economic geography, 
socioeconomics and institutional economics, use a methodological approach of this sort. To 
evaluate the impact of CCS, they adopt diverse criteria, as their relevance is tied to forms and 
objectives that are proper to each system. For example, to measure their ability to avoid social 
and economic exclusion, two criteria are usually adopted: direct creation of jobs at local level, 
and the increase in economic, social and human capital held by persons in a situation of 
exclusion. Seyfang (2003) adopted another one that is the ability of CCS to enable users to 
assert their rights as citizens: social rights (integration into networks, bonds of reciprocity), 
economic rights (having an income; receiving recognition in work; consuming; saving), and 
political rights (participating in public and associative decision-making). Fare (2011) keeped 
three multi-dimensional criteria: territorialisation of activities (localisation of exchanges, 
creation of social links, participation in democratic process); intensification of the dynamics 
of exchange (development of access to credit, empowerment, struggle against poverty), and 
transformation of practices, lifestyles and social representations (responsible consumption, 
ecological citizenship, making organisations responsible, valorising the capacities of each and 
everyone, and collective empowerment).  
 
A problem of viability: the limited purchasing power of money  
Money used to be defined in economics as the instrument of exchange: recognized and 
accepted by all agents for trade. In the beginning there was barter, money then appeared as a 
means of resolving the famous problem of the double coincidence of needs. In other words, 
money is thought of as an invention of the market economy aimed at overcoming barter. It is 
important to underline that this monetary genesis is totally in line with this previous monetary 
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approach. If money is defined as a pure economic object, as an instrument of exchange, its 
genesis stems from an entirely functional model: there is a logistic problem to solve, and the 
appropriate device will be invented accordingly (Ould Ahmed, 2010). The story of the double 
coincidence of needs is a classic explanation of the emergence of money. It can be found as 
early as 1776 (Smith, 1995), then in 1892 (Menger), and persists implicitly today in models of 
pure monetary theory (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993; Williamson and Wright, 1994), despite a 
wide consensus among historians, anthropologists, heterodox economists, and sociologists of 
money refuting this imaginary genesis of money (Aglietta and Orléan, 1998, 2002; Davies, 
1994; Innes, 1913; Ingham, 2000; Servet, 2001; Testard, 2001; Théret, 2007).   
Therefore, money is perceived as is a universal means of payment: that is its value. It 
constitutes a promise of goods to its holder. However, CCS have essentially a limited 
liberatory power: they are special purpose currencies, according to the terminology of 
Polanyi (2008). Indeed, they are valid only for pre-defined uses in space and in time.  
 
A limited purchase power in market spaces  
In the first place, they have territorial limits: they can be used only in a specific geographical 
area). They can also be limited to a particular community (Blanc, 2002): the circulation and 
value of currencies have to be validated by voluntary adherents of the systems. The 
community or association in question has to be set up for the money, which is created by a 
citizens’ movement (Blanc, 2013).  
Furthermore, certain currencies, used for the purchase of specific goods and services, 
can be used only by certain categories of the population. Some initiatives, for example in 
France with local currencies (the Abeille, the Mesure, the SOL Violette, etc.), promote direct 
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consumption towards socio-economic partners who respect social and environmental criteria 
that have been incorporated into a charter after application of selection criteria (Blanc and 
Fare, 2013b). Although these charters often appear rather than a banner, they affirm the values 
and the symbolic universe of the payment community. 
The liberatory power of these currencies can be narrowed still further by rules of usage 
and mechanisms of monetary creation and regulation. Most CCS in circulation are not 
convertible into official currencies. Local currencies (often in paper or electronic), however, 
assume a possibility of conversion, in particular because they integrate into the circuit agents 
of the production and distribution of goods and services. A fixed relation of equivalence is set 
up to link the local to the national currency, and both can be used at the same time. Entry into 
the local system from the national one is possible by converting one currency into the other, 
but exit from the system is not always possible; when it is, it only for professionals; penalties 
are attached to exit (in the form of conversion tax) to limit risks of mass sell-offs of the local 
money (e.g. the Brixton Pound in UK, the Abeille in France). 
Due to the limitation of their purchasing power and the low number of their users and of 
volume of trade they engender, these currencies are all “small-scale” (see Table 2). Despite 
the growth in the number of users as their development, most CCS remain “niche” involving 
relatively few people with a notable exception, however: the Argentine barter clubs, which at 
one time concerned 2.5 million people (Gomez, 2009). Thus Seyfang and Longhurst (2013b) 
see CCS as socio-technical niches, “local grassroots innovations” springing from citizens’ 
initiatives experimenting with alternative lifestyles and sustainable practices that are able to 
grow and influence society on a broader scale. It is also important to stress that unlike the 
CCS that have economic objectives, those that have social aims do not necessarily seek to 
expand their scale of application. This is the case in particular with the French SEL (Laacher, 
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2003; Servet, 1999) and also with some Japanese local currency systems, the chiiki tsûka 
(Hirota, 2006; Nakazato and Hiramoto, 2012). Thus, as far as economics is concerned – it 
usually operates on a far grander scale – CCS tend to be seen as peripheral, too insignificant 
to make much difference in the dynamics of the overall economy.  
However, their validity can be advantageous in terms of territorial development. Indeed 
in the restricted territorial in which they can be used, these currencies can have a beneficial 
effect on local economies, affecting them in an endogenous manner (consumption inside a 
local monetary and territorial space; creation of resources and of new outlets and of jobs), 
promoting a development model based on micro-entrepreneurs and extra-economic values. 
The combination between microcredit and local currency, as in the Brazilian experiment, 
constitutes a particular powerful tool in development by financing productive activities inside 
the territory and improving the local supply. Use of a local and territorial currency can also 
strengthen local community links and local identity as for example by community 
development banks in Brazil (Neiva et al., 2013).  
Some conditions could lead to increase or improve their territorial economic effects. 
First, the size of the experiment (Gomez, 2012): when the size is too small, its impact remains 
marginal, as is shown in Aldrige et al. (2003), who deal with LETS in the UK. The size of the 
scheme depends on the actors involved, and on their diversity. Local authorities can also play 
a decisive role (Blanc and Fare, 2013a). The recognition of the social utility of CCS by public 
authorities and economic decision-makers would increase their potential influence on the 
entire socio-economic system. For example, local authorities could accept the payment for 
public services or payment of local taxes with the local currencies (it is already the case with 
the Bristol Pound in UK for example). Finally, the leverage effect of the CCS increases when 
they are combined with other mechanisms and instruments used by the local authorities and 
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their partners, by connecting up the logics and tools that stem from the social and solidarity 
economy and using them for social and economic development.  
 
A limited liberatory power in time 
Moreover the limitations of the CCS’s use in space, their use are also limited in time. First, 
some CCS have time-limits to their validity. The money “rusts” or “dissolves”, according to a 
principle devised by the economist Silvio Gesell (1958): its face-value decreases regularly 
(three–six-months), and can be restored only by adding a complement (affixing a stamp that 
has to be purchased). Conservation fees can thus be attached to the money in order to 
encourage circulation and dissuade accumulation. Money becomes perishable “like goods and 
labour” (Gesell, 1958, p. 215). His monetary theory was encouraged by Keynes in The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (book 6, note 23) during the US great 
Depression. Local currencies based on a system of stamped notes (subject to the cost of 
demurrage, and depreciating with time) were tried out in the 1930s at Wörgl in Austria, and 
were applied on various terrains, e.g. in the USA in 1933, with Stamp Scrip, under the 
influence of the economist Irving Fisher2 (Gatch, 2012); later, in France during the 1950s, a 
system of local vouchers was developed; very much later, in Argentina, with some currencies 
used by barter clubs; and, as of the new millennium, in Germany, with regional currencies 
(such as the Chiemgauer); and last but not least the Stroud pound, launched in the UK in 2009 
(Scott Cato and Suárez, 2012) and in France with local currencies (for example the Abeille). 
Furthermore, CCS are also seen as transitional, appearing during periods of monetary 
crisis or liquidity shortage, and disappearing as soon as the monetary situation improves. 
Though it is during periods of crisis that many CCSs are seen as offering original solutions to 
economic problems, as e.g. in the case of the Argentine barter clubs, some complementary 
currencies outlast the crises that bring them into being. There are cases of hysteresis. One of 
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the oldest CCSs, the WIR that came into being in Switzerland in the 1930s during the Great 
Depression, is still in circulation today, though admittedly it has evolved, adapting to the 
economic cycle.  
Finally, some CCSs have emerged in contests that were not crises of liquidity or of 
payment (see section 1). Some have come into being for social reasons (as in the case of 
Japanese complementary currency systems) or for environmental ones. This is the case of the 
local currencies of the Towns in Transition in the UK, set up with a view to transforming and 
relocalising sectors such as energy, healthcare, farming, business – in order to make the 
territory more resilient, better able to cope with climate change and peak oil.  
 
A difficulty to recognize this specific monetary plurality regime  
Configurations of monetary plurality regimes are many and various today, corresponding to 
the diversity of units of account and instruments of payment and trade in space defined space 
in terms of markets and territories. The particular case that interests us here is characterised 
by coexistence of an official currency and local currencies that are compartmentalised in 
commercial spaces distinct from one another but nonetheless inter-related. So far, economic 
literature has not evinced much interest in coexistence and plurality. It apparently has 
difficulty in accounting for situations of this sort. Having briefly revisited monetary 
approaches that make it possible to apprehend monetary plurality regimes, we will now turn 
to this question. 
Monetary plurality regimes as understood by contemporary monetary theories 
A synthesis has examined the way in which the main economic theories account for – or fail 
to account for – the question of monetary plurality regime (Blanc et al., 2013). Three series of 
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approaches have been identified. The first one makes no allowance whatever for monetary 
plurality. Only State money is perceived as real money, and only the official authorities can 
issue it. No unofficial means of payment circulating in a territory governed by State 
authorities can be recognised as money (Bell, 2001; Lerner, 1947; Wray, 1999). This is the 
case in particular with the Chartalist school, following the work of Knapp (1924). Monetarism 
also reserves to the State the right to issue money. If the neutrality of money is to be 
guaranteed and inflation controlled, money – or rather, the money supply – cannot be allowed 
to come from a private source. Monetary plurality constitutes a violation of sovereign rights 
and alternative currencies are simply forgeries. 
A second serie of theories recognise a plurality of issuers and of instruments of trade. 
The space provided is nonetheless conditional: the unit of account must be unique. On the 
question of the unit of account, however, there are two very different approaches, not only to 
monetary organisation, but to economics in general. Post-Keynesianismn, post-Marxism and 
French Regulation School (Aglietta and Orléan, 1998, 2002; Théret, 2007) see monetary 
plurality as a characteristic of the monetary economy of production. They reject the 
hypothesis of an exclusive right of the State to issue currency, and recognise a plurality of 
private issuers (e.g. banks, and even enterprises), who put into circulation a diversity of means 
of payment (i.e. private debts). Nonetheless, to enjoy the status of money, these private debts 
must conform to the monetary rule, i.e. prove their capacity for conversion into the official 
currency. Approaches of this type are based on a conception of monetary and banking systems 
as hierarchies over which preside the official currency (the unique unit of account) and the 
official monetary system. Monetary plurality is seen as an expression of the plurality of 
instruments of trade, with levels of acceptance (liquidity) that vary (a factor in crises), and/or 
varying yields. If these alternative currencies are not convertible, the plurality is seen as 
pathology of the monetary system. Another approach, in particular some cash-in-advance 
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models (particularly Sturzenegger, 1992) and search models (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993; 
Kocherlakota and Krueger, 1999), sees monetary plurality as the result of optimal selection by 
rational economic agents. The framework is a decentralised economy regulated by 
competition between markets, with money being treated as an instrument of exchanges. 
Simultaneous circulation of different instruments of trade (e.g. fiat money, national currency, 
foreign currency, interest-bearing cheque accounts, commodity money, credit cards, and so 
forth) is seen as problematic, as the currencies are not perfectly interchangeable and have 
different yields and degrees of acceptability. 
The last serie of approaches takes a normative view, advocating monetary plurality. 
They assume a decentralised market with perfect competition. Examples are Mengerian 
theories of money (Free Banking; the competitive fiat money model) and monetary theories 
that integrate financial economics [New Monetary Economics initiated by Black (1970) and 
Fama (1980)]. Monetary functions are no longer exercised by a single currency; the unit of 
account is issued either by the central bank (in Free Banking and the competitive fiat money 
model) or by the market (NME) and is not connected to the plurality of competing bank 
currencies that serve as instruments of business, and the value of which is determined by the 
market (the financial market in the case of NME). Competitive fiat money models (Hayek, 
1978, 1979; Klein, 1974) go even further, supposing in addition a plurality of units of 
account: banks have their own trademarks and issue their own scrip as a means of payment. 
Monetary plurality is analysed as an optimal arrangement nonetheless subjected to the 
existence of a unique or common unit of account that regulates the system. NME and the 
competitive fiat money models envisage regulation by the market only, and reject all rules of 
convertibility applicable to private moneys on conversion into the central currency. A central 
currency is nonetheless recognised, to guarantee the stability of the system, in the case of 
competitive flat money. NME sets up competition between private banking currencies treated 
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as (interest-bearing) financial assets, and inter-bank settlements are channelled through 
clearing houses. Free Banking (Selgin and White, 1994), does not reject centralisation of 
inter-bank compensation operations and the need to convert one by one private bank 
currencies into a central public currency (the single unit of account). 
 
CCS invalidate the hypotheses of monetary theories 
Monetary plurality approaches mark out the limits of possibility as far as the nature of the 
issuer of money is concerned, at the same time as the legal status of currency, the relationship 
between different currencies in a single space, and regulation of the monetary system. We 
shall now explain why CCS can only be problematic in all the hypothetical, theoretical and 
normative thinking in the above approaches.  
As to the nature of the issuer, first of all these theories recognise only two types: the 
State and banks (and sometimes, though rarely, enterprises). CCS, however, are issued by 
none of these, but by agents who belong to civil society. Monetary economists presumably 
greet monetary initiatives of this sort with a sceptical smile; they see money as a mere tool, 
supposedly technical; its creation and management are matters for technical experts and 
legitimate official institutions. Creation of money by agents of civil society is a breach of the 
traditional practice of monetary sovereignty and of the legal status of national currencies that 
are always held in law to be sovereign and exclusive. National and supra-national monetary 
systems today would seem always to be characterised by a unitary conception of money and a 
hierarchical organisation headed by a central monetary authority in charge of issuing money 
(ensuring the convertibility of private currencies into the central currency) and ensuring the 
stability of the system. Historically, however, the conception of money as homogeneous and 
unique has sometimes been challenged; the reality of this conception has not always been 
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certain; but considerations of this sort have always remained largely marginal; reminders by 
the central sovereignty have apparently sufficed to discourage any dissidence. This is why 
CCS invite all stakeholders in the economy to question their own roles and positions, and to 
reflect on a possible vocation for complementary monetary arrangements. What impact would 
the latter have on the issues raised by the organisation of today’s societies (democratisation, 
new sources of wealth, new values, commons, preservation of resources, 
transition/transformation of behaviour patterns and levels of awareness, etc.)? From a political 
economy perspective of money, and from various cases studies (Argentine barter clubs, SEL 
in France, LETS in UK, Green Money in Hungary, Green dollars in New Zealand, etc), 
studies on CCS show how they play a part in re-territorialising the political by creating new 
spaces for contestation and liberation of monetary order (Laacher, 2003; North, 2007; Ould 
Ahmed, 2009). Complementary currency systems can be apprehended as social organisations 
with political aims, their objective being to construct, by means of collective action, new 
economic and social bonds that respect new values rather than capitalist norms. In these 
systems, the bonds formed between participants are not merely social but also politicised, as 
Smaïn Laacher (2003) has rightly pointed out. In most cases they establish these bonds 
outside conventional political structures, representatives and spaces (Ould Ahmed, 2014). 
However, it is above all the leaders and organisers of these CCS who experience the political 
activism as such; the rank-and-file users’ expectations are more practical, materially and 
symbolically. 
A second characteristic of money is its status. Monetary theories are based on an idea of 
the status of money that is part of law. Only State money and the official means of payment 
are recognised as proper money. Recognition of the monetary nature of private bank 
currencies is conditioned (according to the approach concerned) by convertibility into other 
currencies and/or into the State currency. Money is recognised as such by its legality and 
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convertibility. CCS, however, exist in a legal vacuum, often a “grey zone” in legislation; they 
do not enjoy legal recognition of their status as money and as legal tender. Absence of legal 
recognition has not precluded, in some cases, recognition of social utility (e.g. the case of 
community development banks in Brazil, which are recognised as instruments that can be 
used in the struggle against poverty and exclusion). Their legal framework is currently being 
worked out or is being discussed3. For the time being, however, there is no regulatory 
framework into which they fit or that recognises their specificity (Blanc and Fare, 2013a).  
Most of these currencies have not been recognised by official monetary institutions, 
whether private or public. They are not officially convertible into either private (i.e. bank) or 
public (State) currencies. Not being recognised as part of the official monetary system, most 
of these arrangements are not subject to supervision and regulation by the central bank of their 
respective countries. Lacking convertibility into other currencies of any sort (community, 
bank, national, foreign exchange), their existence is usually tenuous. Their purchasing power 
as we have seen is restricted to the community space in which they circulate. An exception 
should nonetheless be pointed out: local currencies that on the one hand are convertible into 
private bank currencies and, on the other hand, are apparently in some cases subject to 
supervision by the central authorities. This capacity for conversion, however, does not flow 
from a legal obligation but from organisational options taken at the time of their inception.  
The third characteristic of approaches to monetary plurality is their understanding 
money in terms of its substitutability, or as part of a decentralised but hierarchical monetary 
system. Substitutability of currencies stems from the postulate of the fungibility of money, 
money being seen as a universal means of payment, no unit bearing any sign that could 
distinguish it from another of the same value. The use of one currency rather than another is 
therefore simply the result of optimal monetary arbitrages by agents in terms of yield or of the 
transactional costs entailed in the use of alternative currencies. However, highlighting 
 17
qualitative criteria for conversion and differentiation inherent in CCS invalidates this thesis of 
pure fungibility (Blanc, 2008). This leads us to privilege a theoretical approach that allows for 
complementarities in monetary matters, and even for monetary subsidiarity (Fare, 2011, 
2014), instead of competition. The monetary subsidiarity amounts, finally, to determine for 
each currency (taking account of the relevant objectives) a single and singular scale for 
deployment in the framework of a new territorial governance. 
 
Conclusion 
From a deduction of the hypothesis, methodology and normative conceptions of economy and 
money, the complementary currency systems are interpreted – logically – either as non-
monetary phenomena (as they do not constitute legal tender), or as merely insignificant and 
marginal (their purchasing power being too limited); or – yet another possibility – as a 
pathology linked to a lack of official currency in quantity or quality, an ill that can be cured 
by reform of monetary, fiscal or redistribution policy. No matter which interpretation is 
adopted, CCS are not deemed to be a fitting subject for economic literature.  
An economic approach, using socio-economic and anthropological methods seems 
more helpful to reveal the multidimensional nature, the logics and the impact of these 
particular monetary practices. An approach of this sort takes account in particular of the social 
and political contexts in which an economy operates. The literature on CCS, that is still 
emerging, uses this kind of methodology. They also share a rejection of the instrumental 
conception of money that reduces it to a mere tool of commercial trade; they privileges a 
socio-economic and institutional approach to money, its uses and the practices associated with 
it (Aglietta and Orléan, 1998, 2002; Blanc, 2000, 2009; Ingham, 2006; Ould Ahmed, 2008; 
Théret, 2007; Zelizer, 1994). They see money as a basic social institution of all societies, 
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whether commercial or not: the institution that enables people to settle debts thanks to the 
practices of accounting and payment. An approach of this sort takes account in particular of 
the social and political contexts in which an economy operates, and rejects attempts to make 
the economy a natural, autonomous entity (Polanyi, 2008; Steiner andVatin, 2009). 
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Table 1. Main characteristics of some currencies 
CCS 
 
 
 
Countries Monetary 
Forms 
Convertibility 
Actors involved 
Relationship 
with banks 
Relationship 
with local 
shops and 
producers 
Relationship 
with third 
sector or the 
social and 
solidarity 
economy  
Relationship 
with local 
public 
policies  
LETS 
UK 
France 
Japan 
South of 
Africa 
USA 
Germany 
Belgium 
Austria 
Hungary  
Australia 
New 
Zealand 
 
Scriptural 
Non-
convertible 
Autonomous 
It depends on 
the case : 
sometimes 
connected  
More or less 
connected by 
countries 
Seldom  
Currencies in 
Barter Clubs 
 
Argentina Manual 
Non-
convertible 
Autonomous 
May be 
integrated; 
can promote 
Connected 
Sometimes  
connected 
Time banks 
 
UK 
Italie 
USA 
Japan 
Scriptural 
Non-
convertible 
Autonomous Autonomous 
Often 
connected 
Connected 
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Spain 
Greece 
Finland 
Accorderie 
Canada  
France 
Scriptural 
Non-
convertible 
Autonomous Autonomous Connected 
Connected 
(France) 
Local 
complementary 
currency 
 
France 
USA 
Canada 
Manual 
Convertible 
(on entry but 
on exit for 
service 
providers 
only) 
Sometimes 
connected 
At the heart 
of the 
scheme : 
seeks to 
promote 
Connected 
Sometimes 
connected  
Regiogeld 
 
 
Germany 
Manual 
and 
electronic 
Convertible 
(on entry but 
on exit for 
service 
providers 
only) 
Sometimes 
connected 
At the heart 
of the 
scheme : 
seeks to 
promote 
Connected Seldom 
Brazilian 
community 
currencies 
 
 
Brazil 
Manual 
Convertible 
(on entry but 
on exit for 
service 
providers 
only) 
Connected 
At the heart 
of the 
scheme : 
seeks to 
promote 
Connected Connected 
Currencies of 
Towns in 
Transition 
 
 
UK 
Manual 
and 
electronic 
Convertible 
(on entry but 
on exit for 
service 
providers 
only) 
Connected 
At the heart 
of the 
scheme : 
seeks to 
promote 
Connected Connected 
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Experimental 
SOL 
 
 
 
 
France 
Electronic 
Convertible 
(cooperation 
SOL on entry 
but on exit for 
service 
providers 
only), non 
convertible 
(commitment 
SOL and 
assigned SOL) 
Sometimes 
connected 
Connected 
At the heart 
of the 
scheme  
Connected 
Nu 
 
Netherlands 
Scriptural 
Convertible 
(on entry but 
on exit for 
service 
providers 
only) 
Autonomous Connected   Connected Connected 
Source: Adapted from Fare (2011). 
 
Table 2. Some examples of CCS 
Name of 
currency 
Zone of activity Date of 
introduction of 
the currency 
Number of providers Number of individual users 
Palmas Conjunto Palmeira 
(Fortaleza, Brazil) 
2002 270 (in 2013) Not recorded 
Chiemgauer Chiemgau 
(Germany) 
2003 630 (end  2012) 2573 (end 2012) 
Brixton pound Brixton (London, 
UK) 
September 2009 200 (paper money) ; 
100 (payment by  
SMS) (October. 2013) 
3000 used it at least once (by 
2012) 
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Bristol pound Bristol (UK) September 2012 600 (September 2013) A few thousand, 1 200 of 
whom held accounts with the 
Bristol Credit Union (Sept. 
2013) 
Béki Canton of 
Redange 
(Luxemburg) 
2012 71 (January 2014) Not recorded 
UDIS Suchitoto (San 
Salvador) 
2009 100 Not recorded 
Eusko Basque country 
(France) 
January 2013 500 (December 2013) 2 700 (December 2013) 
NU Spaarpass 
incentive card 
Netherlands May 2002 - 
March 2003 
Approx one hundred 10 000 
SOL Alpine 
 
France November 2007 23 (2012) 147 active users (2011) out 
of 1360 holders of cards 
distributed since 2007 
Source: The Authors, using documents distributed by associations supporting CCS and interviews carried out ad 
hoc. 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1
 The website http://www.complementarycurrency.org/ccDatabase/ managed by Stephen DeMeulenaere, founder 
and coordinator of the Complementary Currency Resource Centre (CCRC), details this diversity. 
2
 During the US Great depression in the 1930s, Fisher proposed to set up this kind of monetary rule to Roosevelt 
(but he didn’t convince him). 
 
3
 In France, we refer readers to the CCS/SOL network and ACPR (the French supervisory authority on banking 
and insurance) for information on the legal and monetary framework applicable to CCS. 
In an article published in the APCR review (Revue de l’APCR) in 2013, the authority officialised its position on 
CCS, indicating the legal framework it intended applying to them http://www.acpr.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/acp/publications/revue-acp/201309-Revue-autorite-controle-prudentiel-
resolution.pdf Discussions of the same sort are, more or less advanced, in progress elsewhere, in particular in 
Belgium and the UK. For the latter see Naqvi and Southgate (2013). 
 
